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Abstract
This study examined the impact of MRI-based evidence on juror perceptions of guilt in a
criminal case. Jury eligible undergraduates read one of three mock trial summaries of a
murder case wherein MRI evidence was manipulated: (1) MRI evidence with accompanying
neuroimages, (2) MRI evidence without accompanying brain images, or (3) no MRI
evidence. The proportion of guilty verdicts rendered was statistically similar across all
conditions. In addition, participants did not list MRI evidence as the most influential piece of
evidence for their verdict. Based on the results of this study it appears that MRI-based
evidence and neuroimages do not significantly influence the juror decision making processes.
Implications and future directions are discussed.
Keywords: MRI, murder, forensic evidence, juror decision making
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The Impact of Forensic Evidence on Juror Perceptions of Guilt
Forensic evidence includes polygraph evidence, fingerprint matching,
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, and a variety of neuroimaging techniques [e.g.,
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)]. In its courtroom application, forensic evidence is
circumstantial—it requires a juror to make a decision regarding the connection between the
evidence and the facts. Forensic evidence forms the basis for two types of arguments:
character- and location-based arguments. Attorneys may use the evidence to suggest the
defendant is lying (character-based; e.g., polygraph evidence) or use it to suggest the
defendant was present at the scene of the crime (location-based; e.g., fingerprint matching,
DNA analysis).
Empirical research examining the effect of forensic evidence on juror perceptions of
guilt often involve presenting mock jurors with a trial summary that differs in the types of
evidence presented (McAllister & Bregman, 1986; McCabe, Castel, & Rhodes, 2011; Myers
& Arbuthnot, 1997; Myers, Rosol, & Boelter, 2003). Participants are asked to render a
verdict as if they were present at the trial. If the proportion of guilty verdicts in all conditions
is similar, then it is assumed that the forensic evidence does not influence juror verdicts.
Using this aforementioned methodology, this study assesses the impact of MRI on juror
perceptions of guilt.
Independent of empirical research, courtroom judges maintain the belief that forensic
evidence may improperly [emphasis added] influence the jury. Court decisions reflect the
concerns that forensic evidence may usurp the role of jurors as triers of facts (U.S. v.
Scheffer, 1998), may cause juror confusion and prejudice, and may not be accepted in the
relevant scientific communities (U.S. v. Alexander, 1975). Of particular concern to the

judicial system is the question, “How much does forensic evidence influence a juror’s
decision?”
Legal Precedent for Forensic Evidence
United States (US) courts have different rules regarding the admissibility of forensic
evidence. These rules regarding forensic evidence are changeable. Historically, US courts
have deemed polygraph evidence, fingerprint matching, and DNA analysis both admissible
and inadmissible at some point in time. For example, US courts traditionally accepted the
results of a polygraph test as evidence. In the past few decades, however, courts have
consistently abandoned the use of polygraph evidence. The US Supreme Court has
determined that polygraph testing does not meet the Daubert standards of evidence
admissibility (refer to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993). Specifically, the
conclusions drawn from polygraph examiners are plagued with doubt, considered subjective,
and neither verifiable nor falsifiable. Additionally, the polygraph test can be manipulated by
various countermeasures (U.S. v. Scheffer, 1998).
Fingerprint matching is more readily accepted as evidence in US courts. Recently,
however, several courts have ruled that the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and
Verification (ACE-V) method of latent fingerprint identification is unreliable (Cooper v.
Dupnik, 1992; Maryland v. Rose, 2007; U.S. v. Plaza, Acosta, & Rodriguez, 2002). The
presiding judge in Maryland v. Rose noted several shortcoming of fingerprint analysis.
Specifically, there is no objective criterion for determining a match, and the fingerprint
analyst is not required to document the process of analysis, so there is no meaningful peer
review process. Consequently, the error rate of fingerprint analysis is unknown.
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Courtroom acceptance of DNA has also changed. DNA analysis was first submitted
as evidence in the mid-1980’s and was accepted without challenge (Lieberman, Carrell,
Miethe, & Krauss, 2008). During that time it had been referred to as the single greatest
advance in the legal system’s search for truth (People v. Wesley, 1988). However, it was
quickly challenged by the National Research Council of the United States of America (1992)
who questioned a number of practices used by forensic scientists, which led to the
improvement of validation standards set by the scientific community. Within the last decade,
DNA analysis has been viewed as the most reliable form of forensic evidence (Hans, Kaye,
Dann, Farley, & Albertson, 2011; Lieberman et al.; Myers, Latter, & Abdollahi-Arena,
2006). Despite strides in DNA analysis techniques, researchers continue to empirically
investigate and question its validity and all other novel forms of forensic evidence.
Jurors’ Perceptions of Forensic Evidence
In criminal trials, the prosecution and defense gather and present evidence that they
believe will prove their case. In this respect, the criminal trial is an adversarial presentation
of facts that may or may not convince jurors that an accused person is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Given the variety and complexity of forensic evidence, it is not surprising
that individual jurors weigh each type of evidence differently.
Myers et al. (2006) suggests that polygraph evidence does not affect juror perceptions
of guilt. Mock jurors rate the accuracy of polygraph tests between 62.0% and 68.0% (Myers
et al., 2006). This is surprisingly low given that expert witnesses rate the accuracy of the
polygraph test around 85.0% (Myers et al., 2006). In addition, Myers and Arbuthnot (1997)
found no significant differences in verdicts when participants received the polygraph
evidence individually or in groups. In fact, less than 2.0% of jury deliberations focused on
3

the polygraph evidence. Although jurors appear to place more emphasis on other forms of
forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprint matching and DNA analysis) than polygraph evidence
(Myers et al., 2003; Myers et al., 2006), polygraph evidence can have an impact on the final
verdict when it is coupled with corroborating evidence (e.g., medical and eyewitness
testimony; Myers et al., 2003). In summation, polygraph evidence does not lead to an
increase in the likelihood of a guilty verdict.
Contrary to polygraph evidence, fingerprint matching is location-based. Fingerprint
matching places the defendant at the scene of the crime or ties the defendant to other physical
evidence. Jurors perceive this type of evidence as more incriminating than character-based
evidence (e.g., the results of a polygraph test; Myers et al., 2006). McAllister and Bregman
(1986) assessed the impact fingerprint analysis has on juror perceptions of guilt by
comparing it to the effects of eyewitness testimony. Participants read a trial summary
involving an alleged armed robbery and murder. Participants then read that fingerprints on
the gun had either been (a) positively identified as belonging to the defendant, (b) identified
as not belonging to the defendant, or (c) unidentifiable. After the trial, participants rendered
verdicts and rated defendant culpability on a 9-point scale. Participants rated the defendant as
more guilty in the fingerprint identification condition when compared to participants in the
fingerprint nonidentification and unidentifiable condition. McAllister and Bregman’s
research indicates that fingerprint evidence increases the likelihood that a juror will find the
defendant guilty.
Contrary to polygraph evidence and fingerprint matching, DNA analysis evidence has
become the revolutionary scientific tool in the search for truth (Lieberman et al., 2008). If a
suspect’s DNA (e.g., blood, semen, hair sample, etc.) matches DNA recovered from the
4

crime scene, then it follows that the suspect was present at the crime scene. Therefore, as
with fingerprint matching, DNA analysis provides attorneys with a location-based argument.
However, understanding how jurors incorporate DNA evidence into their decisions is
difficult because of its mathematical complexity (Koehler, 2001). Koehler demonstrated that
framing DNA match statistics as probabilities (e.g., “The probability that the suspect would
match the blood drops if he were not their source is 0.1%”) makes the evidence more
persuasive than framing DNA match statistics in a mathematically equivalent fashion (e.g.,
“One in 1,000 people in Houston would also match the blood drops”). Additional research
indicates that jurors are confident in the accuracy of DNA analysis evidence. On a measure
of trustworthiness, Myers et al. (2006) reported that 96.0% of participants rated DNA
analysis evidence as more trustworthy than polygraph evidence.
Jurors can and do understand DNA evidence (Hans et al., 2011). Potential jurors
understand basic information about mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA; Hans et al.).
Mitochondrial DNA is gathered from teeth, bones, and hair and is less individualizing than
DNA samples from blood or semen (Hans et al.). Hans and colleagues gathered demographic
information from potential jurors based on their educational background and experience with
specific science courses. These participants viewed a videotaped trial summary involving an
alleged armed robbery at a bank. The evidence described a lone, masked gunman in a blue
sweatshirt who fled the crime scene. While in pursuit, local police found the suspect’s
discarded hooded sweatshirt and the stolen currency. Laboratory examination of the
sweatshirt revealed two hairs which were sent to an FBI crime laboratory for investigation. In
addition, the summary included the defendant’s reference to a half-brother who lived in the
area. The half-brother had the same father but not the same mother and acted as a “red
5

herring” because the half-brother would not share the same mtDNA sequence given that he
had a different mother. Two experts talked about maternal inheritance but were not
questioned about it. This evidence was included to see if mock jurors could be lured into
believing the half-brother was the source of the mtDNA (Hans et al.).
After viewing the trial summary, participants were tested on their knowledge of
mtDNA evidence. When asked, “In your own words, what is mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA)
evidence?” 80.0% of participants made at least one correct statement, whereas only 20.0%
made an incorrect statement. Also, juror comprehension was positively related to the number
of math and science courses jurors had completed. Lastly, the reference to the half-brother
did not appear to confuse jurors, as 84.0% correctly noted that mtDNA does not come from
both the mother and father. These results indicate that jurors generally understand forensic
evidence and are able to incorporate it into their decisions.
Magnetic Resonance Imaging-Based Evidence
MRI is a medical imaging technique commonly used in radiology. It allows
researchers to visualize detailed internal structures (e.g., the brain, muscles, the heart, and
various cancers) through the process of nuclear magnetic resonance (Qian & Wei, 2012).
This technology is not to be confused with functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Functional MRI is a noninvasive neuroimaging technique that identifies active areas of the
brain by measuring oxygenated blood flow to areas of cortical activity (Bhatt et al., 2009).
Functional MRI is used to map areas of the brain that require more oxygen during behavioral
tasks, but can also be used to demonstrate brain abnormality and to detect whether someone
is telling a lie (Bhatt et al.; Davatzikos et al., 2005). A simple method of understanding the
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difference between the imaging technologies is to consider that MRI represents brain
structure while fMRI represents brain function.
Researchers have empirically established a link between criminal and violent
behavior and brain structure using MRI (see Mobbs, Lau, Jones, & Frith, 2007; Raine, 2008,
for reviews). However, it is important to note that while MRIs are common medical
procedures, scientists do not agree on what, if anything, MRI techniques and its
neuroscience-based derivatives (i.e., functional magnetic resonance imaging) tell us about
human behavior (Aue, Lavelle, & Cacioppo, 2009; Heeger & Ress, 2002). Consequently,
judges and legal scholars have raised concerns about the conclusions drawn from
neuroscience-based evidence (Dresser, 2010). Regardless of concerns, neuroscience-based
evidence is now on the precipice of being allowed as a form of forensic evidence in US
courts.
To date, MRI evidence use has been documented in two cases. One US court has
allowed MRI evidence that links brain abnormality to individual behavior. In this court, MRI
evidence was used as mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a death penalty case
heard in Chicago, Illinois (Madrigal, 2009; Saenz, 2009). The defense argued that the
defendant should not be put to death because the MRI evidence suggested that the defendant
had an abnormal brain. The decision to allow MRI evidence to be presented at trial may
reflect the legal system’s view that death is a serious, irreversible form of punishment. The
legal rules that govern the death penalty aim to ensure extraordinary procedural safeguards
(Vidmar & Hans, 2007). The other documented use of MRI evidence was in Roper v.
Simmons (2005). The Supreme Court received an amicus brief from the Coalition for
Juvenile Justice (CJJ) suggesting that adolescent brains are not fully formed which
7

contributes to an increase in impulsivity and mood swings in adolescents (Brief of the CJJ,
2005). It was unclear whether the Supreme Court used the evidence in its decision because
the Court did not mention the evidence in its written conclusion (Madrigal).
Currently, only one study has examined the impact MRI-based evidence has on juror
perceptions of guilt (McCabe et al., 2011). This experiment used functional MRI (fMRI), a
similarly noninvasive technique that allows scientists to observe the results of an MRI scan
over time during a behavioral task (e.g., lying; Bhatt et al., 2009). Participants who read a
trial summary with fMRI lie detection evidence rendered more guilty verdicts than
participants who read the same trial summary with polygraph evidence, thermal imaging (i.e.,
another novel form of lie detection), or no lie detection evidence. Neither MRI nor fMRI
have been extensively researched in juror decision-making studies.
To address this lack of research, the present study uses MRI to suggest [emphasis
added] that the defendant had characteristics of psychopathy. These characteristics include an
unusually high tendency to act impulsively without thinking and an increased tendency to
take risks and seek thrills (see Appendix B, paragraphs 10 and 11; McCabe et al., 2011). The
MRI expert in this trial did not use the word psychopath to describe the defendant. This
argument is loosely character-based (i.e., the defendant has behavioral problems) and does
not make a connection between psychopathy and criminality.
Previous research indicates that providing brain-related information to participants
may unduly influence how participants assess scientific data. One study gave neuroscience
experts, students in a neuroscience course, and laypersons a brief description of a
psychological phenomenon (Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2009). They were
also given an explanation for the phenomenon that was manipulated (high quality vs. low
8

quality) along with the content of explanation (with neuroscience vs. without neuroscience).
All neuroscientific explanations were irrelevant to the psychological phenomenon.
Participants from all three groups rated high quality explanations as more satisfying than low
quality explanations. Participants also rated explanations with neuroscience information as
more satisfying than explanations without neuroscience information. Moreover, student and
laypersons, compared to neuroscience experts, rated explanations with logically irrelevant
neuroscience information as more satisfying than explanations without neuroscience
information.
MRI evidence with brain images may be particularly damaging to a defendant.
McCabe and Castel (2008) claim that the fascination with and the perceived credibility of
neuroimaging lies in the persuasive power of the images themselves. McCabe and Castel
demonstrated this persuasive power by creating mock scientific articles (e.g., “Watching TV
is related to math ability”). In their mock article, it is suggested that both watching TV and
performing math problems increase frontal lobe activation, therefore watching TV improves
math ability. McCabe and Castel asked participants to read mock articles that varied by the
presence vs. absence of brain images. Participants who read the article and were presented
with accompanying brain images rated the claim as more valid than participants who only
read the article.
The difference between MRI evidence with and without brain images is an important
distinction. Links between criminal and violent behavior and brain structure have been
empirically established (Mobbs et al., 2007; Raine, 2008). Thus the image is an integral part
of the MRI results. This image, however, would be subject to rules 403 and 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence (Cornell University Law School, 2010). Rule 403 states that
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relevant evidence may be excluded if it creates unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, a
waste of time, or misleads the jury. Rule 702 suggests that an expert witness may testify if
the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable methodology, and
the witness has applied the methodology to the facts of the case. An image, however, may be
excluded if it violates the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is not clear whether neuroimages
create unfair prejudice, although previous research indicates that neuroscience explanations
were rated as more valid with neuroimages than without (McCabe & Castel, 2008). Thus, it
is possible that the images submitted along with MRI evidence may create unfair prejudice.
In addition to being underused in the legal system, the effect of MRI evidence on jurors’
perceptions of defendant guilt has not been thoroughly researched in the field of psychology.
Present Study
The present study was designed to determine if MRI influences jurors’ perceptions of
guilt. The trial summary involved behaviors related to psychopathy. Research has
demonstrated that there are structural brain differences between diagnosed psychopaths and
control subjects without psychopathy (Gao, Raine, & Phil, 2010). The MRI evidence
suggested [emphasis added] that the defendant has psychopathic tendencies, which creates a
link between the brain structure and the murderous behavior.
Participants assessed defendant guilt based on evidence presented in a written trial
summary. The summaries included 22-24 points of evidence and differed in only one aspect:
one-third of the trial summaries included MRI evidence with brain images, one-third
included MRI evidence without images, and one-third did not include MRI evidence.
Participants also completed a post-trial questionnaire that assessed both juror perceptions of
guilt and the influence and accuracy of the evidence presented.
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Based on previous research involving brain images and fMRI evidence (McCabe et
al., 2011; Weisberg et al., 2009), it was hypothesized that: (1) both MRI conditions would
lead to more guilty verdicts than the control condition; (2) the MRI evidence condition with
brain images would lead to more guilty verdicts than both the MRI condition without brain
images and the control condition; and (3) the part of the trial summary that includes MRI
evidence would be listed as the most influential piece of evidence.
Method
Participants
Data was collected from 119 psychology undergraduates, who had not yet taken
courses in cognition or behavioral neuroscience, from Western Washington University.
Participants volunteered to participate in a study involving juror decision making via Sona
Systems. Ten participants were removed from the analyses for marking “no” to the question
“Are you a U.S. citizen?” The remaining 109 participates (51 male, 58 female) were jury
eligible (i.e., U.S. citizens over the age of 18 years of age). The mean age of the overall
sample was 19.34 (SD = 1.95). Participants received course credit for approximately 30
minutes of participation.
Design
Experimental sessions, rather than participants, were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions. The independent variable was MRI evidence presented in a trial summary.
MRI evidence was (1) presented with corresponding brain images (MRI + Images), (2)
presented without brain images (MRI), or (3) not presented (control).
The primary dependent variables were (1) verdict (guilty vs. not guilty), (2) ratings
for likelihood of defendant guilt and participant confidence in his/her verdict, (3) selection of
11

one piece of evidence that was most influential to the decision, and (4) a rating of how
influential this evidence was in rendering the final verdict. Influence and accuracy ratings of
all testimony presented were also assessed.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were given a packet containing a pretrial demographic questionnaire, a trial summary, and a post-trial questionnaire. The entire
packet was completed and returned into the experimenter. Participants were then given an
additional multiple-choice manipulation check questionnaire to assess whether they had read
and understood the trial summary. After completing the manipulation check items and
returning it to the experimenter, participants were thanked, given a one-page debriefing form,
and then dismissed.
Materials
Trial summary. The trial summary was adapted from the trial, State v. Givens, created
by Kassin and Sommers (1997) and used by McCabe et al. (2011). In this trial, the defendant,
Brad Givens, is charged with murdering his estranged wife and her lover. The prosecution
claims that the defendant murdered the couple in a jealous rage, while the defense maintains
the Givens found the bodies when he returned home to retrieve personal papers. The trial
summary is three pages long (i.e., 22 paragraphs). It includes opening and closing statements,
the examination and cross-examination of six witnesses (a private investigator, police officer,
coroner, eyewitness, the defendant, and a friend of the defendant), and the judge’s
instructions. A number was placed next to each paragraph and served as an aid for the posttrial questionnaire. The summary was designed to be “circumstantial, incomplete, and
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ambiguous” (Kassin & Sommers, pp.1048) to ensure that the inclusion of the MRI evidence
would influence the verdict.
MRI conditions. Both MRI conditions (MRI + Images and MRI) included two
paragraphs of testimony from Dr. Ronald Tinsworth, a psychiatrist. The information
presented in the MRI conditions was held constant; the only difference between the two
conditions was the absence vs. presence of MRI images. The name of the defendant and the
content of Dr. Tinsworth’s testimony were adapted to match the language used in State v.
Givens.
In his testimony, Dr. Ronald Tinsworth presented the results of a personality
evaluation and scans from the defendant’s brain using MRI. The personality evaluation
measured psychopathic tendencies (e.g., tendency to act impulsively without thinking and
tendency to take risks and seek thrills), though Dr. Tinsworth never stated that the defendant
is psychopathic. Dr. Tinsworth explained that, according to the personality evaluation, the
defendant has “an unusually high tendency to act impulsively without thinking and to take
risks and seek thrills (Appendix B, paragraph 10).” His assessment was corroborated by the
results of the MRI. Dr. Tinsworth noted that the MRI showed reduced gray matter density in
the left middle frontal gyrus and left superior frontal gyrus of the defendant’s brain when
compared to normal individuals; thus, the MRI suggested that the defendant not only has
poor inhibitory control, but also has issues with impulsivity. Dr. Tinsworth concludes that his
results have been replicated in the scientific community. During his cross-examination, Dr.
Ronald Tinsworth concedes that “MRI is a useful medical and diagnostic tool, [though the
results] are not conclusive of impulsive tendencies and poor inhibitory control specific to the
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results of personality evaluations (Appendix B, paragraph 11).” Tinsworth further concedes
that the results of MRI are contested in the scientific community.
The MRI + Images condition included brain images adapted from Rigoni et al.
(2010). These brain images are from the brain of an actual young woman tried for violent
murder. This woman underwent psychiatric evaluation using Lilienfeld and Widows’ (2005)
Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revisited (PPI-R; as cited in Rigoni et al.). Rigoni et al.
also obtained an MRI scan of her brain relative to six healthy control participants. The MRI
scan in the Rigoni et al. study showed reduced gray matter density in the left superior frontal
gyrus and the left middle frontal gyrus of the woman’s brain when compared to healthy
control participants. Her red areas indicate areas of the brain that are lacking gray matter
density. For the purpose of the present study, the woman’s images were used to represent the
defendant’s brain function (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 of Appendix C for the experimental
adaptations).
Pre-trial questionnaire. The pre-trial questionnaire assessed the participant’s sex, age,
year in school, citizenship status, and prior jury experience (see Appendix A).
Post-trial questionnaire. The post-trial questionnaire assessed verdict preference and
perceptions of the evidence.
Verdict preference was defined by an assessment of guilt (guilty vs. not guilty), a
likelihood of guilt rating ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 6 (very likely), and a confidence
in verdict rating ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 6 (very confident). Perception of the
evidence was defined by (1) a participant’s selection of the most influential piece of
evidence, (2) a rating of how influential it was in rendering the final verdict ranging from 1
(not at all influential) to 6 (very influential), (3) ratings of the overall influence of the
14

prosecution and defense ranging from 1 (not at all influential) to 6 (very influential), and (4)
ratings of influence and accuracy from every witness testimony ranging from 1 (not at all
influential/accurate) to 6 (very influential/accurate; see Appendix D).
Manipulation check questionnaire. The manipulation check questionnaire included up
to seven multiple-choice questions that assessed the participants’ memory for specific details
of the case. Four of the questions assessed memory for specific facts of the case (e.g., “What
was the alleged murder weapon?” and “What is the name of the defendant in the trial?”).
These four questions were presented in every condition. Three additional questions assessed
how well participants understood the MRI evidence (see Appendix E). Note that the MRI
questions were specific to conditions that included MRI evidence.
Results
Randomization Checks
A chi-square test of independence was conducted to determine if the distributions of
participant sex, prior jury experience, and year in school were similar across conditions. Nonsignificant differences across conditions indicate that participant sex (χ 2(2, N = 109) = 3.06, p
= .217, Cramér’s V = .17), prior jury experience (χ2(2, N = 109) = 2.05, p = .359, Cramér’s V
= .14), and year in school (χ2(2, N = 109) = 8.70, p = .191, Cramér’s V = .20) were evenly
distributed across conditions. A one-way, between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to
determine if participant age varied across conditions. Age was evenly distributed across
conditions, F(2, 106) = 2.77, p = .067, η2 = .05.
Verdict Preference
Table 1 shows the proportion of guilty verdicts for each condition. In order to test
Hypotheses 1 and 2, a chi-square test of independence was conducted to determine if the
15

proportion of guilty verdicts differed by condition. The chi-square test of independence
indicated that the proportion of guilty verdicts was not influenced by MRI testimony nor
MRI testimony that included images (χ2(2, N = 109) = 1.90, p = .388, Cramér’s V = .13).
One-way, between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted to determine if the likelihood
of guilt and confidence in verdict ratings differed by condition. Participant ratings of the
likelihood of guilt did not differ by condition (F(2, 106) = 2.43, p = .093, η2 = .04), nor did
participant ratings of confidence in verdict (F(2, 106) = 0.69, p = .504, η2 = .01). Thus,
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not confirmed. See Table 2 for mean ratings of guilt and
confidence by condition.
Perceptions of MRI Evidence
In order to test Hypothesis 3, participants were asked to list the piece of evidence
most influential to their verdict (Appendix D, question 4). Hypothesis 3 predicted that MRI
evidence would be listed as the most influential piece of information presented in the trial
summary.
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, the closing statement of the defense attorney (paragraph
23), the closing statement of the prosecuting attorney (paragraph 21), and the crossexamination of the defendant (paragraph 19) were selected by the most participants.
Paragraph 23 was selected by 30.8% of the participants, and all of the participants who
selected it rendered not guilty verdicts. Paragraph 21 was selected by 16.8% of the
participants and almost all (94.4%) of the participants who selected it rendered guilty
verdicts. Paragraph 19 was selected by 13.1% of the participants, and all of the participants
who selected it rendered guilty verdicts. The remaining pieces of evidence were selected by
4.7% or fewer participants. A chi-square test of independence (using only participants who
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listed paragraph 19, 21, or 23) was conducted to determine if participant selections of the
most influential piece of evidence differed across conditions. Selection of paragraphs 19, 21,
and 23 did not differ significantly by condition, χ 2(4, N = 65) = 3.91, p = .419, Cramér’s V =
.17.
Participant ratings of MRI expert influence, MRI expert accuracy, and MRI
procedure accuracy were analyzed to better understand the probative value of MRI evidence.
The results indicated that participants were not that influenced by the testimony of the MRI
expert (M = 2.96, SD = 1.36). Participants did, however, perceive the testimony of the MRI
expert as somewhat accurate (M = 3.99, SD = 1.09). The MRI procedure itself was also
perceived as being somewhat accurate (M = 3.46, SD = 1.45). An independent-sample T test
was conducted to determine if influence and accuracy ratings of the expert’s testimony
differed as a result of the MRI images. The expert’s testimony was more influential in the
MRI condition (M = 3.39, SD = 1.34) than the MRI + Images condition (M = 2.53, SD =
1.25; t(70) = 2.82, p = .006, d = 0.66). However, the expert’s testimony did not differ in
ratings of accuracy between conditions (t(70) = 1.19, p = .239, d = 0.28). Additionally,
perceptions of the accuracy of the MRI procedure did not differ between conditions (t(70) =
.89, p = .376, d = 0.21).
Perceptions of Trial Evidence
No hypotheses were generated for the other forms of trial evidence. Separate oneway, between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted to determine any differences for the
following conditions: (1) participant ratings of the overall case presented by the prosecution;
(2) participant ratings of the overall case presented by the defense; (3) participant ratings of
influence and accuracy for the testimonies of the private investigator, police officer, coroner,
17

eyewitness, friend of the defendant, and the defendant himself. No significant findings
emerged (all p’s > .05).
Manipulation Check
The manipulation check assessed participant knowledge of general case facts and the
MRI evidence. A one-way, between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to determine if
participant recall of trial facts differed by trial condition. Each of four general case facts were
dummy coded so that 1 = correct and 0 = incorrect. Participant recall was assessed by
creating a separate variable equal to the total number of correct responses for each participant
(i.e., between 0 and 4). Participant recall did not differ by condition, F(2, 106) = .12, p =
.885, η2 = .00. Participants recalled almost all four facts of the case (M = 3.94, SD = .28).
This indicated that participants read and understood the trial summary. Table 3 shows the
percent of correct responses to each general knowledge item.
An independent-sample T test was conducted to determine if participants responses to
MRI specific questions varied by trial condition. Participants in the control condition were
not included in this analysis because they did not receive any MRI specific questions. Each
of three MRI questions were dummy coded such that 1 = correct and 0 = incorrect.
Participant performance was assessed by creating a separate variable equal to the total
number of correct responses for each participant (i.e., between 0 and 3). Participant
performance on the MRI specific questions did not differ by condition, t(71) = -.25, p = .801,
d = 0.06. Across both MRI conditions participants answered approximately half of the
questions correctly (M = 1.86, SD = .86). Table 4 shows the percent of correct responses to
each MRI manipulation check question. Overall, 57.5% correctly answered the question
about the defendant’s specific behavioral problems, 39.7% correctly answered the question
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about what MRI can conclusively demonstrate, and 89.0% correctly answered the question
about what the MRI did demonstrate, suggesting there may have been some confusion
regarding the MRI expert’s testimony.
Discussion
The current study investigated the influence of neuroimaging evidence on juror
perceptions of guilt. Contrary to all three proposed hypotheses, MRI may not influence juror
perceptions of guilt. Specifically, the MRI evidence did not affect guilty verdicts rendered by
jurors (Hypothesis 1 and 2), nor was the MRI evidence selected as the most influential piece
of evidence (Hypothesis 3).
Results from the present study were largely inconsistent with previous research
(McCabe et al., 2011). In McCabe et al., jurors rendered more guilty verdicts when presented
with fMRI-based methods of lie detection evidence than with polygraph, thermal imaging, or
no lie detection evidence. This effect was attributed to an explicit link between biology and
behavior, suggesting that a biological basis for a defendant’s criminal behavior increases
jurors perceptions’ of guilt. Based on the study by McCabe et al., it would appear that
evidence of lying is more compelling when it is accompanied by evidence that was obtained
directly from the brain (McCabe et al.). However, results from the present study did not show
an increase in guilty verdicts in the MRI evidence conditions.
The present study’s results, however, are reconcilable with patterns found in McCabe
et al. (2011). McCabe et al. included a validity questioned condition in which the fMRI
expert admitted during his testimony that the conclusions drawn from fMRI images have
been wrong in several cases. Guilty verdicts in the validity questioned condition and control
condition were equivalent, suggesting that jurors become skeptical of the procedure and
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found the evidence less persuasive when the procedure was called into question. The present
study also provided participants with evidence obtained directly from the brain. However, the
validity of the MRI procedure was called into question through the cross-examination of the
MRI expert in both MRI conditions. In this respect, all MRI conditions were validity
questioned conditions, and none of the conditions isolated the effect of the MRI evidence
without questioning the validity of the scientific procedure. Thus, one explanation for the
null results in this study is that the effect of neuroimaging technology may have been reduced
and/or eliminated when the validity of the procedure was called into question during crossexamination, as it was in the McCabe et al. study.
The null results could also be the result of poor understanding of the MRI evidence.
Specifically, question 2 (“Dr. Ronald Tinsworth concluded that Givens had all of the
following behavioral tendencies except?”) was answered correctly by only 57.5% of the
participants. Several possibilities exist that explain this poor level of performance. It is
possible participants were distracted by the term “except”. “Except” questions require the
reader to select an answer that is incorrect. The word was italicized and underlined to draw
attention to the word and prevent confusion. Another possibility for poor participant
performance is answer similarity. Answers a, b, and c were all mentioned in the same
sentence during Tinsworth’s testimony: “[He] claims that Givens has an unusually high
tendency to act impulsively without thinking and to take risks and seek thrills.” Answer d
(“Tendency to anger easily”), however, is a behavioral tendency one can still associate with a
defendant who has been charged with first degree murder. Lastly, the sentence does not take
long to read. It is possible that the information may have been glossed over by the
participants. Next, question 5 (“MRI can conclusively demonstrate which of the following?”)
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was answered correctly by only 39.7% of the participants. The question was designed to test
whether the participants understood that MRI evidence does not conclusively demonstrate
any link between brain and behavior. Answer b, “Individuals with reduced gray matter are
more impulsive,” was selected by 95.5% of the participants who missed the question.
Reduced gray matter and impulsivity were a part of Tinsworth’s original testimony; however,
answer b is incorrect because Tinsworth conceded that the results of the MRI are not
conclusive of impulsive tendencies or poor inhibitory control during his cross-examination. It
is likely the participants who selected answer b were unable to distinguish between Dr.
Tinsworth’s original testimony and his cross-examination.
The present study found that neuroimages do not create unfair prejudice. This finding
is inconsistent with previous research (McCabe & Castel, 2008). Neuroimages were expected
to increase the impact of the MRI evidence. One explanation for this null finding is that the
MRI evidence was not useful to participants in their verdict decisions. This explanation is
supported by the fact that only 5.6% of participants selected the MRI evidence as the most
influential piece of evidence presented in the trial summary. If the MRI evidence was not
useful in rendering a verdict, then the additional MRI images would have also been irrelevant
to the process of rendering a verdict. Another explanation could be a “trying too hard” effect
in which participants feel the prosecution is using the neuroimages to fill in the holes of an
incomplete and circumstantial case. If this were true, then participants may have believed the
neuroimages were presented to cover up the fact the prosecution did not have other forms of
evidence (i.e., DNA or fingerprints) linking the defendant to the crime.
Inconsistent results may also be attributed to the testimony of the expert witness, Dr.
Ronald Tinsworth. Firstly, prior research indicates that expert witness credibility is important
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(Horowitz et al., 2001) and that the general public is unaware of what a psychiatrist does
(Williams, Cheyne, & MacDonald, 2001). In Williams et al., half of the sample did not know
that psychiatrists were medically qualified, and 80% underestimated the length of psychiatric
training. The present study did not modify Tinsworth’s credibility. Without modifying the
credentials of the expert, it is impossible to determine if a neurologist using MRI would have
had more influence on juror perceptions of guilt than the psychiatrist. Secondly, Tinsworth
did not educate jurors on the importance of the images, nor did he explain in any detail what
gray matter is or what its function is in the human brain. Kovera and colleagues (1997)
determined that the experts’ attempts to educate jurors influence their decision making
processes. A more informed jury may have rendered a different verdict.
A simpler explanation for the results may be that functional MRI evidence is not the
same as MRI evidence. The null results could potentially reflect differences in the technology
or differences in the application of the technology (i.e., structure vs. function). Functional
MRI evidence was used in McCabe et al. (2011) to demonstrate that the defendant lied about
killing his wife. In this instance, fMRI captured the activity of lying in an image. Conversely,
the present study used MRI to image the structure of the defendant’s brain. The resulting
image was used to imply that the defendant has an abnormal brain resulting in behavioral
deficits. Both the McCabe et al. and the present study adapted their trial summaries from the
Kassin and Sommers (1997) study. The key difference between these two studies was the
type of evidence (MRI versus fMRI) and not the trial summaries.
These explanations aside, it can be concluded the null results related to Hypotheses 1
and 2 are not due to a lack of randomization, ceiling or floor effects, nor a lack of statistical
power. Specifically, the randomization checks showed that participant age, sex, juror
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experience, and year in school were successfully distributed across conditions. In addition,
participants were only moderately sure the defendant was guilty (M = 4.11, SD = .98) and
moderately confident in their verdict (M = 4.18, SD = 1.04). The means and standard
deviations of the likelihood of defendant guilt and verdict confidence ratings suggest that any
change in these dependent measures, due to an effect of the independent variable, could have
been detected. Thus, both ceiling and floor effects were avoided. Lastly, a power analysis
was conducted to determine if there was sufficient power to detect the effect sought. The
sample (N = 119) was large enough to detect medium effect sizes with sufficient power (i.e.,
80) at α = .05 (Cohen, 1992).
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, less than 6.0% of the participants selected the MRI expert’s
testimony as the most influential piece of evidence. Although the low selection rate indicates
that participants did not view the MRI evidence as the most influential piece of evidence, it
does not indicate how participants utilize the MRI evidence in their decision-making process.
It may be that, in the circumstances of this case, one point of evidence is not as influential as
the entire case for or against the defendant. Thus, the null results for Hypothesis 3 may have
been made possible by allowing participants to select the closing arguments. The closing
statement of the defense attorney (paragraph 23) was the most influential piece of evidence
followed by the closing statement of the prosecuting attorney (paragraph 21). The closing
arguments represent the collective weight of all pieces of evidence rather than one isolated
piece of evidence.
Lastly, participant ratings of the accuracy of MRI evidence (both expert testimony
and the procedure itself) suggest the inclusion of MRI images does not affect perceptions of
accuracy. However, participants rated the MRI expert’s testimony as more influential in the
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MRI condition than the MRI + Images condition. This finding is inconsistent with research
that suggests neuroimages increase ratings of validity (McCabe & Castel, 2008). One of four
explanations may account for this inconsistency. One, participants may have realized that the
neuroimages were unnecessary because the MRI expert adequately explained the tests he ran
on the defendant. Two, participants may have picked up on the experimental manipulation as
the neuroimages were separately attached to the trial summary. However, this explanation is
unlikely because experimental sessions, rather than participants, were randomly assigned to
conditions. Participants would not know other groups received different evidence.
Additionally, with only one former juror as a participant, participants would not know that
attaching neuroimages during a legal proceeding is a controversial topic (Rosen, 2007).
Three, participants may not have understood the MRI evidence. If this were true, then
participants would not find the inclusion of the images useful. This explanation is supported
by poor participant performance on two of the three MRI manipulation checks. Lastly, the
finding that MRI evidence without images was more influential than MRI evidence with may
be an artifact of p < .05. All other statistical analyses yielded non-significant results. This
result may have been obtained by chance.
Limitations
The conclusions drawn from this data must also be considered in the context of
several potential methodological limitations. First, the trial summary was short. Participants
had a half hour to read, comprehend, and evaluate the evidence for a trial intentionally
designed to be circumstantial and ambiguous. Additionally, each witness’s testimony was
approximately one paragraph in length. Although the use of trial summaries is typical in jury
research, this form of evidence presentation does not generalize well when compared with
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the experience of an actual juror (Kessler, 1975). In addition, this methodological choice
allows participants to base decisions on a small fraction of the potential information that
would be available during an actual trial. This may account for why participants indicated
that the summary paragraphs by the defense and prosecution were most influential.
Second, this study uses a student sample rather than a community sample. Students,
although jury eligible, are not the only members of a community eligible for jury duty. Some
researchers have argued that decisions rendered by WEIRD (western, educated,
industrialized, rich, and democratic) college students may not be representative of those
rendered by actual jurors (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Other researchers have
found no difference in juror decisions rendered by students and community samples
(Devenport & Cutler, 2004; Devenport, Stinson, Cutler, & Kravitz, 2002; Myers et al., 2003;
Myers et al., 2006). The present study did exclude all participants who were not jury eligible.
It is believed that this sample did not negatively influence the results because both students
and laypersons have limited exposure to neuroscience information (Weisberg et al., 2009).
Third, this study did not include a deliberation process. Jury deliberations are
underrepresented in juror research (Bornstein & McCabe, 2005) primarily due to time and
money constraints (Studebaker et al., 2002). The exclusion of a deliberation limits the
external validity of the present study, as some critics have argued that an individual decision
is not the same as a decision reached through deliberation (Devine, Clayton, Dunford,
Seying, & Pryce, 2001). This argument is predicated on the notion that deliberation has the
ability to change individual juror decisions. A meta-analysis on jury deliberations provided
the argument that, in one out of ten trials, deliberations resulted in a reversal of the verdict
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preference originally favored by the majority (Devine et al.). It is unclear whether a
deliberation would have changed the results of the present study.
Finally, this study was a simulation. Participants were invited into a classroom, asked
to read a brief summary of a trial, and given course credit for their participation. Simulation
methodology raises the question “Are the participants motivated to render a just decision?”
Some critics argue that simulations do not reflect the real-world consequences of an actual
trial and thus mock-jurors’ may not be motivated to thoroughly process the evidence and
render thoughtful verdict decisions in a trial simulation (Bornstein & McCabe, 2005). For
example, pre-deliberation questionnaires indicate that actual jurors believe their verdicts have
consequences for the defendant and feel that their decisions are significantly more important
than those of mock jurors (Bornstein & McCabe). Other researchers, however, have found
that the artificial nature of a simulation does not affect participant motivation or verdict
preference (Kerr, Nerenz, & Herrick, 1979; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). Critiques of simulation
based research are accepted and encouraged for the scientific advancement of knowledge and
understanding. It must be understood, however, that jury research using simulated trials is the
norm in the relevant scientific community (e.g., refer to the reference section of Bornstein
and McCabe for a variety of studies using simulation-based methodologies). Given the status
of the simulation-based research debate, it is unclear how the artificial nature of the
experiment affected the results.
Implications for Future Research
The present study would suggest several directions for future research. One
recommendation involves further investigation of the effect of neuroimages on juror decision
making. The present study manipulated the presence vs. absence of neuroimages. However,
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several aspects of the neuroimages have yet to be researched. Future studies should have
participants rate the relevance of the neuroimages, making it possible to analyze the impact
the image itself has on individual jurors perceptions’ of defendant culpability. Additionally,
the neuroimages of the defendant can be visually compared to the images of normal
(emphasis added) individuals. Neuroimages have been introduced as evidence in court
(Madrigal, 2009). Also consider the severity of the brain damage represented in the images.
The present study presented a brain with reduced gray matter in the left middle frontal gyrus
and left superior frontal gyrus. A lesion or tumor in these areas, for example, may elicit a
different response from jurors. These modifications are important first steps to understanding
the influence those images have on juror perceptions of guilt.
Another recommendation involves the cross-examination of the MRI expert about the
validity of the MRI procedure. An opposing attorney, in an actual trial, may or may not
question the validity of the MRI procedure. How an attorney cross-examines a witness
depends on several factors not addressed in this study (e.g., the quality of the attorney, the
attorney’s knowledge of MRI, etc.). The present study is only generalizable to court cases in
which an attorney questions the validity of the MRI procedure. Our understanding of a
“validity questioned” effect can be enhanced by a study that manipulates the forensic
evidence presented at trial separately from whether the validity of the forensic evidence is
called into question. This will allow researchers to generalize to trials that do and do not
question the validity of a scientific procedure. Furthermore, the way in which the attorney
questions the validity of the forensic procedure during cross-examination should also be
examined, as some types of questioning strategies may be more or less effective than others.
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Furthermore, future studies should address how and why forensic evidence is
influential. In the current study, participants were asked to select the paragraph that was most
influential to their verdict. Unfortunately, a majority of participants selected the closing
arguments as the most influential piece of evidence. By selecting a closing argument, a
participant is indicating that all [emphasis added] evidence is required to render a verdict.
Future studies should exclude the closing arguments as evidence that may be selected and
require participants to select only individual pieces of evidence. The selection of a single
piece of evidence better indicates what evidence jurors find influential. Additionally,
participants could rank the five most influential pieces of evidence. This serves the purpose
of providing researchers with a basic hierarchy of what evidence carries the most probative
weight. Conversely, participants could rate the influence and importance of every individual
piece of evidence. This enables a researcher to quantitatively observe and statistically test the
influence of the experimental manipulation as well as the other evidence presented during the
trial.
Finally, an open-ended, free-response question could provide a qualitatively rich
explanation of jurors’ perceptions of the evidence (refer to the Hans et al., 2011
methodology). Qualitative assessment helps researchers establish theories for how and why
evidence is influential. In essence, free-response questions provide a considerable amount of
data that can be useful for developing hypotheses. This approach is one of the best ways to
determine what questions future studies in the field should address.
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Table 1
Proportion of guilty verdicts by evidence condition.
Evidence
Condition

Guilt

MRI + Images

.42

MRI

.57

Control

.44

Overall

.48
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Table 2
Mean ratings of guilt and confidence by condition.
Evidence

Guilt

Confidence

Condition

M (SD)

M (SD)

MRI + Images

3.86 (0.93)

4.22 (1.12)

MRI

4.12 (0.88)

4.03 (0.99)

Control

4.36 (1.07)

4.31 (1.01)

4.11 (0.98)

4.18 (1.04)

Overall

Note. Mean ratings of guilt and confidence range from not at all (1) to very (6). Appendix D
contains question 2 (likelihood of guilt) and question 3 (confidence in verdict).
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Table 3
Correct responses to the “general facts of the case” questions of the manipulation check.
Percent
Question

Total N Correct

What was the alleged murder weapon?

109

99.1

Which witness did not testify?

109

99.1

When asked why there was no blood...?

109

99.1

What is the name of the defendant?

109

96.3

Note. Questions are located in Appendix E.
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Table 4
Correct responses to the “MRI” questions of the manipulation check.
Percent
Question

Total N Correct

Givens had all of the following except…?

73

57.5

MRI can conclusively demonstrate what?

73

39.7

The results of the MRI demonstrated what?

73

89.0

Note. Questions are located in Appendix E.
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Appendix A
Juror Decision Making Study
Please complete the following questions to provide the researchers with basic demographic
information. Circle the correct response or fill in the blank with the appropriate information.
Sex:

Male

Female

Age:
Year in school:

Freshman

Sophomore

Junior

Are you a U.S. citizen?

Yes

No

Have you ever served as a juror?

Yes

No
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Senior

Appendix B
New York v. Givens
1. What follows is a summary of the criminal trial proceedings in the case of New York v.
Givens. The defendant, Brad Givens, was charged with two counts of murder.
2. In his opening statement, the prosecutor claimed the evidence will show that Brad Givens
strangled his wife to death and stabbed a neighbor, Scott Maddox. Givens denies
involvement in the murders, but the evidence will prove that he had the motive, means, and
opportunity. Givens went crazy when his wife, Marylou, asked for a separation, leaving him
to rent an apartment. Obsessed and suspicious that she was having an affair, he hired a
private investigator to follow her and was frustrated when nothing turned up. Givens was in a
“fragile” and “explosive” emotional state.
3. Continuing his opening statement, the prosecutor outlined his theory of the case. On the
night of the murder, Givens came home and found Scott Maddox, a neighbor, in the kitchen
with Marylou. He flew into a fit of rage and stabbed Maddox repeatedly in the chest.
Marylou may have tried to stop the attack, but Givens strangled her. He then fled, disposed
of his knife and eventually called the police. Realizing that he was seen running from the
house, and that his fingerprints were all over the place, Givens came up with a story—that
Maddox and his wife were already dead when he arrived.
4. The defense attorney opened by claiming that all the evidence is purely circumstantial.
After all, Givens never confessed, no murder weapon was found, and nobody saw what
happened. The defense attorney argued that the State’s assessment of Givens’ explosive
emotional state was exaggerated. Givens admitted he was jealous, but the evidence will show
that he was in control of his emotions that night and was trying to rebuild his life.
5. Continuing his opening statement, the defense explained that Givens went home that night
to get some personal belongings. When he arrived, he found the victims dead. He checked
them and then tried to revive his wife. In shock, Givens ran out of the house. After a few
minutes, he managed to compose himself. He called the police and waited for them to arrive.
A man is not guilty of murder simply because he was jealous. Once all the facts are in, it will
be clear that the prosecution has failed to prove its case.
6. The first witness for the prosecution was David Prescott, the private investigator Givens
had hired. Prescott said that Givens thought his wife was having an affair, but that he found
no proof of it. Givens had paid him $3,000 and seemed frustrated by the result. He pulled
Prescott off the case four days before the murder “even though I’m sure she’s screwing
around”. The defense lawyer objected to this last remark because it was hearsay. However,
the judge overruled the objection.
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7. On cross examination, Prescott said he was surprised he wasn’t let go sooner than he was.
He described Givens as a cool-headed guy who still loved his wife. The prosecuting attorney
objected to this characterization as just an opinion. The judge sustained the objection, so
Prescott restated his testimony: “Givens acted like he loved his wife”.
8. The next witness was Ed Johnson, one of two police officers to meet Givens at the house.
Johnson met Givens outside at 8:40 pm and then went in to inspect the bloody crime scene.
Johnson described how he found the bodies, fully clothed, and on the floor of the kitchen. He
immediately secured the area while a forensic examiner took photographs. There was no
evidence of a forced entry and there was nothing missing from the house. Johnson arrested
Givens, read him his rights, and took him in for questioning.
9. On cross-examination, Johnson said that no weapon was ever recovered and described the
defendant as deeply upset over his wife’s death. When asked why Givens was charged
without any hard evidence, Johnson said that his story just didn’t make sense, even before
they knew of his marital problems.
10. The next witness, Dr. Ronald Tinsworth, a psychiatrist, presented the results of a
personality evaluation and scans from Givens’ brain using magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI). According to the results of his personality evaluation, Tinsworth claims that Givens
has an unusually high tendency to act impulsively without thinking and to take risks and seek
thrills. The results of the MRI demonstrate reduced gray matter density in the left middle and
superior frontal gyrus of Givens’ brain. Similar reductions in gray matter are shown in
individuals with impulsive tendencies and poor inhibitory control.
11. On cross-examination, Dr. Tinsworth stated that MRI is a useful medical and diagnostic
tool, but that reduced gray matter are not conclusive of impulsive tendencies and poor
inhibitory control specific to the results of personality evaluations. Furthermore, some
scientists have argued that structural differences in the brain do not always suggest
personality disorder.
12. The State’s next witness was Dr. Neil Gravane, coroner in the case. Gravane testified that
Maddox died of a 2-inch laceration of the chest, probably caused by a hunting knife with a
curved edge. Based on the height and angle of the wounds, Dr. Gravane concluded that the
killer used his right hand and stood about 6-feet tall, like the defendant. Marylou Givens died
of a shortage of oxygen and had a deep bruise on her throat, indicating she was strangled.
13. On cross-examination, Gravane conceded that the murder weapon was a common type of
knife and is readily available. The State objected that a medical doctor is not qualified to
speculate on matters of availability. The judge overruled the objection. On further crossexamination, Gravane admitted that his estimate of the killer’s height was just that, an
estimate, not a fact.
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14. The final witness for the prosecution was Jeffrey Ostrander. Ostrander testified that he
was sitting in his car waiting for his girlfriend the night of the murder. Suddenly, he saw
someone run out the front door of the Givens house with something in his hand, and drive
off.
15. On cross-examination, Ostrander said it was dark and that he wasn’t sure what the man
he saw was holding in his hand. On further questioning, he said he could not tell whether the
man he saw was the defendant. He also conceded that he had no idea of what actually
happened inside the house or why the man he saw came running out.
16. The first witness for the defense was Joe Davis, a friend of Brad Givens. According to
Davis, he and Givens had drinks at a local bar the night of the murders and Givens admitted
that he had overreacted to his wife’s request for a separation. Davis said that on that night
Givens was calm and “in control of his emotions”. The two men had “only a couple of beers”
and then parted because Givens wanted to return home to get some stuff from his desk.
17. On cross-examination, Davis admitted that Givens had in the past expressed “frustration”
about his wife. He also admitted that he and Givens had hunted together and that Givens
owned at least one hunting knife. That night, he said that he and Givens left the bar at 7:30
pm and that the drive home took fifteen minutes. Davis was asked if he was such a good
friend to Givens that he might lie for him. The defense attorney objected to this question as
argumentative. The judge sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard it.
18. Next the defense called Givens. Givens conceded that he hired an investigator, but then
he called it off. He said that on the night of the murder, he had a couple of beers with Davis,
went home to get some stuff, and saw his wife and Maddox dead in the kitchen. He said he
touched Maddox to see if he was alive and then tried to revive his wife. Describing himself
as “in shock”, Givens left the house and eventually called the police. He denied having
anything to do with the murders.
19. On cross-examination, Givens was asked where he went in the time before he called the
police. He said he just drove around for awhile. He was scared and didn’t know what to do.
Eventually he went to his apartment, about a mile from the house, and called the police.
When asked why there was no blood on his hands if he had touched Maddox, Givens said he
had no idea. After intense probing, he said “I don’t remember. Maybe I washed it off”.
20. The prosecutor began his closing argument by reminding the jury that two innocent
people were senselessly murdered, leaving behind four grieving parents, seven brothers and
sisters, and other loved ones. “For these living victims, whose lives will never be the same,
ladies and gentleman, justice will not be served until the man responsible for these brutal
deaths is punished”.
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21. Summarizing the evidence, the prosecuting attorney noted that Givens was consumed by
such intense jealousy that he paid $3,000 to a private investigator. He fit the physical profile
of the killer and had a key to the house, which is why there was no sign of a forced entry. He
also left fingerprints all over the place, especially in the kitchen and on his wife, despite the
fact that he had moved out weeks earlier. The weapon was never found, but Givens did own
hunting knives and had ample time to dispose of the weapon. He also had no alibi; not a
single person saw him in the half hour it took him to call the police. In light of all the
evidence, the defendant should be found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.
22. The defense lawyer began the closing argument by acknowledging that Brad Givens is an
emotional man. Emotion made him rush to his wife when he found her dead, and then it
made him flee the scene in shock. But we also heard from Givens’ friend that he was in
control of his emotions that night and had come to accept the fact that he and his wife were
separated.
23. Givens’ actions after the crime were not those of a guilty man. He called the police,
waited for them to arrive, and then cooperated. He was noticeably saddened by the death of
his wife. So just what is the case against Givens? There was no confession, no weapon, and
no eyewitness, only weak circumstantial evidence. “You can’t convict a man of murder
because he is 6-feet tall, owns hunting knives, and is upset over being separated from his
wife”. The defense attorney concluded by arguing that the State failed to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt and that Givens should be found not guilty.
24. The judge told jurors that all the relevant and material facts were in and that their duty
was to deliberate until they reached a unanimous verdict. In determining the defendant’s guilt
or innocence, he said, one may consider his action before, during, and after the crime was
committed. The judge reminded the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the
State has the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Appendix C

Figure 1 | Region of the left middle frontal gyrus showing reduced gray matter density in
Givens’ brain relative to healthy control participants.

Figure 2 | Region of the left superior frontal gyrus showing reduced gray matter density in
Givens’ brain relative to healthy control participants.
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Appendix D
For the following questions please circle the appropriate answer. One question requires you
to fill in the blank.
1. If you were a juror for this trial, would you find the defendant guilty or not guilty?
Not guilty

Guilty

2. How likely is it that the defendant is guilty?
Not at all likely
1

2

Very likely
3

4

5

6

3. How confident are you in your decision?
Not at all confident
1

2

Very confident
3

4

5

6

4. Which piece of evidence was most influential in your verdict? Please indicate the number
from the trial summary (the paragraphs in the summary are numbered for your reference).
Indicate the number here: _____
5. How influential to your decision was this piece of evidence on your final verdict?
Not at all influential
1

2

Very influential
3

4

5

6

6. Overall, how influential was the evidence presented by the prosecution?
Very weak
1

Very strong
2

3

4

5

6

7. Overall, how influential was the evidence presented by the defense?
Very weak
1

Very strong
2

3

4
45

5

6

8. How influential to your decision was the testimony of David Prescott, the private
investigator, regarding Givens’ alleged jealous behavior?
Not at all influential
1

2

Very influential
3

4

5

6

9. Based on your opinion, how accurate was David Prescott’s testimony?
Not at all accurate
1

2

Very accurate
3

4

5

6

10. How influential to your decision was the testimony of Ed Johnson, the police officer,
regarding the scene of the crime?
Not at all influential
1

2

Very influential
3

4

5

6

11. Based on your opinion, how accurate was Ed Johnson’s testimony?
Not at all accurate
1

2

Very accurate
3

4

5

6

12. [If participants received MRI evidence] How influential to your decision was the
testimony of Dr. Ronald Tinsworth, the MRI expert, regarding Givens’ mental state?
Not at all influential
1

2

Very influential
3

4

5

6

13. [If participants received MRI evidence] Based on your opinion, how accurate was Dr.
Ronald Tinsworth’s testimony?
Not at all accurate
1

2

Very accurate
3

4

46

5

6

14. [If participants received MRI evidence] Based on your opinion, how accurate was the
MRI evidence with regard to the defendant’s mental state?
Not at all accurate
1

2

Very accurate
3

4

5

6

15. How influential to your decision was the testimony of Dr. Neil Gravane, the coroner,
regarding the hunting knife wound?
Not at all influential
1

2

Very influential
3

4

5

6

16. Based on your opinion, how accurate was Dr. Neil Gravane’s testimony?
Not at all accurate
1

2

Very accurate
3

4

5

6

17. How influential to your decision was the testimony of Jeffrey Ostrander, the eyewitness
who saw someone leaving Givens’ house?
Not at all influential
1

2

Very influential
3

4

5

6

18. Based on your opinion, how accurate was Jeffrey Ostrander’s testimony?
Not at all accurate
1

2

Very accurate
3

4

5

6

19. How influential to your decision was the testimony of Joe Davis, the friend of Givens,
regarding Givens’ emotional control at the bar?
Not at all influential
1

2

Very influential
3

4

47

5

6

20. Based on your opinion, how accurate was Joe Davis’ testimony?
Not at all accurate
1

2

Very accurate
3

4

5

6

21. How influential to your decision was the testimony from Brad Givens himself?
Not at all influential
1

2

Very influential
3

4

5

6

22. Based on your opinion, how accurate was Brad Given’s testimony?
Not at all accurate
1

2

Very accurate
3

4

48

5

6

Appendix E
1. What was the alleged murder weapon?
a.

Gun

b.

Rope

c.

Poison

d.

None of the above

2. [If participants received MRI evidence] Dr. Ronald Tinsworth concluded that Givens had
all of the following behavioral tendencies except?
a.

Increased risk seeking behavior

b.

Tendency to act impulsively

c.

Increased tendency to seek thrills

d.

Tendency to anger easily

3. Which witness did not testify?
a.

Jake Acton, bartender

b.

Brad Givens, defendant

c.

David Prescott, private investigator

d.

Dr. Neil Gravane, coroner

4. When asked why there was no blood on his hands, what did Givens reply?
a.

“I didn’t touch the blood.”

b.

“I don’t want to answer.”

c.

“I don’t know. Maybe I washed it off.”

d.

None of the above
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5. [If participants received MRI evidence] MRI can conclusively demonstrate which of the
following?
a.

The defendant is psychopathic

b.

Individuals with reduced gray matter are more impulsive

c.

The defendant’s actions were excusable because of the brain damage

d.

None of the above

6. What is the name of the defendant in the trial?
a.

Ed Johnson

b.

Neil Gravane

c.

Brad Givens

d.

None of the above

7. [If participants received MRI evidence] The results of the MRI demonstrated which of the
following?
a.

Increased blood flow to the orbitofrontal cortex

b.

Reduced gray matter density in left superior frontal gyrus

c.

Slower brain processing speed than normal

d.

None of the above
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